

Chairperson's Introductory Remarks

It would of course not come as a surprise to any of the regulators present that the regulatory infrastructure of Member States varies considerably. The IAEA safety and security series, however, remains the backbone for a regulatory infrastructure that - *when implemented* - provides for high level of safety and security in all operations, whether they are nuclear or involve radiation in any other way.

Reviews of the infrastructure for safety and security have shown us that when things go wrong – and we have had recent experience of this - it is usually not because of flaws in the system itself. Rather, it is because of the shortcomings in how it is, or has been, implemented. The issue is safety (and security) *as operated* – where the implementation of the safety and security framework is the critical factor.

This is why IAEA peer reviews are so important, and we are in particular going to discuss the *Integrated Regulatory Review Service Missions*, or IRRS Missions, today.

The process of an IRRS is well-known and straightforward: The host country performs a self-assessment of its governmental, legal and regulatory infrastructure against, in particular, the safety fundamentals and requirements, compiles the material that is necessary for the review into the advance reference material, the mission verifies the host country's assessment and based on its observations issues:

- *Recommendations* – where deviation from the safety standards are found;
- *Suggestions* – where improvements can be made; and
- *Good practices* for others to take note of.

It is then up to the host country to implement the necessary actions. A follow-up mission should ideally be carried out within 2 – 4 years to verify implementation of the actions.

Obviously one size does not fit all, either we are talking about the regulatory infrastructure or more specifically about IRRS. We are dealing with countries with very mature and large nuclear programmes at one end of the spectrum, and small countries with limited resources at the other end. In the latter group there are two subgroups, one with nuclear aspirations and one without such aspirations, at least for now. The particular problems imposed by constraints of resources are dealt with in the afternoon session and I'd like to emphasise that IRRS is not only for the big nuclear power countries but are equally important for small programmes operating with very limited resources, to make sure the infrastructure covers all areas and ensures use of radiation where appropriate without undue risks.

In the intervening session, we will focus on cyber and information security. It is well recognised that the responsibility for nuclear security rests with each State, and that appropriate and effective national systems for nuclear security are vital in facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and enhancing global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The vulnerability of sensitive nuclear security **information, systems, instrumentation and control** items - and their integrated use within safety and security systems - remains a significant concern to Member States.